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The last forty years have seen a number of proposals to approximate corporate tax
bases and tax rates in Europe in order to level the playing ﬁeld for business com-
petition. The recent report by the European Commission on the future of company
taxation in Europe (Commission of the European Communities, 2001), points out
that diﬀerences in national corporate tax systems aﬀect location decisions of ﬁrms,
impose barriers to cross-border investments, impair the eﬃciency in the capital
market, and foster international tax planning.1 To remedy these problems the Com-
mission argues that there is a need for coordination of corporate tax systems among
EU member states. The Commission’s report shows that there is large variation in
eﬀective corporate tax rates across EU member states due to tax rate and tax base
diﬀerentials. The Commission’s main proposal is to move towards a consolidated tax
base for European multinational companies, to be allocated across member states
through a formula apportionment system. This proposal entails a certain degree of
tax base harmonization. The alternative road ahead pointed out by the Commis-
sion, is one of harmonization of national tax bases and tax rates within the current
system of corporate taxation systems among the EU member states.2
The need for a level playing ﬁe l di nt h eE u r o p e a nU n i o nh a sa l s ob e e nh i g h l i g h t e d
recently by the entry of new EU member states whose eﬀective tax rates often are
signiﬁcantly below those of ’old’ member states. Illustrative of the problem is Nicolas
Sarkozy (French Secretary of the Interior and at the time minister of ﬁnance and
economic aﬀairs) who proposed to refuse payment of most EU-subsidies (i.e., from
Structural Funds) to the new EU-countries, whose eﬀective tax rates are signiﬁcantly
below EU-average, in order to prevent their tax advantage from creating ”excessive”
tax competition.3
This paper argues that the discussion over tax rates and base approximation
has overlooked the eﬀects harmonization of tax bases or tax rates may have on
the stability of international cartels. We show that harmonization of tax rates may
increase or decrease collusive behavior, but that the most likely outcome is that it
1For a survey of proposals and the recent, so-called Bolkestein-report of the EU see Devereux
(2004), Mintz (2004) and Sørensen (2004).
2Mintz (2004) argues that the focus should be on tax bases rather than tax rates.
3See, e.g., Financial Times Deutschland, September 7, 2004, and Neue Züricher Zeitung, Sep-
tember 8, 2004. Countries like, i.e., Lithuania or Hungary have lowered their (eﬀective) tax rates
to 13% resp. 16% in order to attract multinationals from established member states.
2reinforces incentives to stay in cartels. Furthermore, any type of harmonization of
tax bases is always undesirable from society’s point of view, but bilateral and full
harmonization to a common standard is worse than unilateral harmonization to a
minimum tax standard.4 The implication of our analysis is that, on the one hand,
there are very clear negative eﬀects of harmonization on collusive behavior, but on
the other hand, there are beneﬁts of a level playing ﬁeld for corporate taxation
systems. A full analysis of corporate tax reform needs to address these eﬀects in a
uniﬁed framework. This is a topic that is left for future research.
Collusive behavior in an international setting has been conﬁrmed by a number
of studies and many of these are summarized in Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2004).
In short, international collusive behavior has been established in industries such as
pharmaceutical, chemical, cars, diamonds, telecommunications, uranium yellowcake,
Canadian potash, cement, plastic pipe, electronics, and wood pulp.5 Cooperation
within these industries involves price ﬁxing schemes that in some cases have been
going on for a decade or more. The costs of such activities, as documented in the
empirical literature, are substantial.6 The potential damage to the economy by car-
tels has been highlighted in Monti (2001); ”Estimations by the OECD in its recent
Report on Hard Core Cartels7 have provided dramatic ﬁgures. The average in-
crease from price ﬁxing is estimated to amount to 10% of the selling price and the
corresponding reduction of output to be as high as 20%. In some recent big cases
prices have been increased by the cartel participants 30% to 50%.”8
The ﬁghting of cartels has been a clear priority of the European Commission.
It is therefore a paradox that no link has been made to the possible eﬀects of tax
harmonization on collusive behavior in the Commission’s reports on corporation tax
systems.
The issue of tax harmonization has been discussed extensively in the public ﬁ-
nance literature in relation to ﬁscal externalities between countries. The canonical
tax competition model predicts that competition among countries over mobile cap-
4The latter approach has been adopted by the EU in its eﬀorts to harmonize commodity taxes.
See Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2004) for an analysis.
5See Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2004) for a survey.
6See e.g., Slade (1995), Scherer (1996), King (1997) and Steen and Sørgard (1999).
7OECD 2000.
8The industries involved are graphite electrodes and citric acid.
3ital leads to too low tax rates and underprovision of public goods in equilibrium.9
From this model follows the policy recommendation that tax coordination or har-
monization is desirable in order to correct the ﬁscal externality from competition.
However, this view is challenged by the Public Choice literature. Here the argument
is that competition in general, and competition among governments in particular, is
beneﬁcial because it reduces government waste and disciplines politicians.10 These
studies, however, do not have competition and collusive behavior as their focal point.
Related to our study is Gendron (2001) who in a closed economy setting analyzes
the eﬀect on collusion of alternative loss oﬀset provisions under the corporation tax.
He ﬁnds that an increase in refunds of tax losses may enhance collusive behavior.
More recently, Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2004) analyze the choice of international
tax principle in commodity taxation and how it aﬀects cartel stability. Their results
a r ei nl i n ew i t ht h er e s u l t sp r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e r .T h e yﬁnd that tax harmonization
strengthens collusive behavior irrespective of commodity tax principle in place. To
our knowledge there are no other studies that are directly comparable to ours or to
the Hauﬂer and Schjelderup study.
Our results are brought forward by using a standard model of dynamic price
competition and tacit collusion.11 The framework is a two-country, two-ﬁrm set-
ting, where the national product markets are of equal size and costs of production
are the same for both ﬁrms in order to highlight how diﬀerences in national tax
systems aﬀect the stability of cartels. Section 2 outlines the model and section 3
analyzes cartel stability. Section 4 investigates the eﬀects of bilateral and unilateral
tax harmonization, while section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider two ﬁrms, labelled by i ∈ {1,2}, w h i c ha r el o c a t e di nc o u n t r y1 and 2,
respectively. They produce amounts xi of an identical and homogenous good, and
9See the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). A survey of the
literature is given in Wilson (1999).
10E.g., Brennan and Buchanan (1980), McLure (1986), and more recently Rauscher (1998).
11The same model has previously been used to study ‘reciprocal dumping’ in a trade context (see
Pinto, 1986), to compare tariﬀs and quotas (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1989), to study the eﬀects of
trade liberalization as in Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), and to compare diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes (Meckl, 1996). Recently, Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2004) have studied how international
principles of value-added taxation aﬀect the stability of collusive agreements.
4tacit collusion between the two ﬁrms implies that both ﬁrms refrain from exporting.
Each ﬁrm is thus a monopolist in its home market. In each period, either ﬁrm may
defect from this implicit agreement and export to the other market, but such action
causes future retaliation by the other ﬁrm. If ﬁrm i defects, it does so in the ﬁrst
period (t =0 )a n de x p o r t st oc o u n t r yj. It will catch ﬁrm j by surprise and we
deﬁne this as the deviation phase of the game. In the following period(s), however,
ﬁrm j retaliates by exporting to market i. This is the punishment phase of the game.
Furthermore, as in the literature on repeated games we assume a trigger strategy
which implies that ﬁrm j will retaliate by exporting to market i in all subsequent
periods. Hence, if one ﬁrm defects in period t =0 , duopoly competition prevails
in both markets in t =1 ,2,...∞. Furthermore, we assume that national markets
are segmented, i.e., diﬀerent producer prices can be set in the two national markets
under both monopolistic and duopolistic market structures.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ed e n o t eb yπM
i the proﬁto fﬁrm i if it acts as a monopolist in
its domestic market, πE
i is the extra proﬁti np e r i o d0 when ﬁrm i defects and exports
into the other market, and πD
i is the total duopoly proﬁt (earned in both markets to-
gether) of ﬁrm i under mutual export competition. Denoting δi as the discount factor
of ﬁrm i (0 < δi < 1), defection from the cartel solution is unproﬁtable whenever the
present value of staying forever in the cartel, πM
i /(1 − δi), i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a l
to the proﬁts of defecting from the agreement, that is, (πM
i + πE
i )+πD
i δi/(1 − δi).
Thus, we can write the “stability condition” for the collusive agreement as:12






, ∀ i ∈ {1,2}, (1)
where θi ≡ δi/(1 − δi) is the relative discount factor of ﬁrm i,a n d¯ θi is the size of
this rate that just leaves the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between staying in the secret cartel and
defecting. The critical values ¯ θi diﬀer between the two ﬁrms (as will become clear
later) due to diﬀerences in the corporate tax system. In general, it is the ﬁrm with
the higher critical value of ¯ θi, which is more likely to break the collusive arrangement.
H e n c ei ti st h i sﬁrm’s ¯ θi that is binding for the stability of the secret cartel.13 For the
12We assume that πM
i > πD
i holds throughout the analysis.
13As pointed out by Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2004): If ﬁrm j has the higher critical value of ¯ θ,
then ﬁrm i (i 6= j) could improve the stability of the collusive agreement by oﬀering ﬁrm j an e w
contract (for example a ﬁfty-ﬁfty split of the two markets). Such market sharing, however, poses
a problem. The reason is that it is much easier to detect a breach of agreement if a ﬁrm exports
(when it should not) than if it produces beyond the agreed export quota. The cost of monitoring,
5analysis to come, it is useful to note that the higher ¯ θi is under a given scenario, the
lower is the likelihood that the collusive agreement is stable, since a smaller range
of (common) relative discount factors θ sustains the cartel solution.
3P r o ﬁts and cartel stability
We assume that the size of the market in each country is the same and that ﬁrms
have the same costs. Demand functions in both markets are linear and given by
xi = a − pi, where pi is the consumer price, xi is demand, and a>0 is a market
size parameter that denotes maximum sales at a price of zero which is identical for
both countries. In principle we could allow market size diﬀerences, but the purpose
here is to investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerences in corporate tax systems only, and we
therefore refrain from analyzing the interaction of taxes with other parameters.14
T h ee c o n o m i cp r o ﬁto ft h eﬁrm is
πi = pixi − cxi,i =1 ,2.
where c is (constant) marginal cost.
We assume that taxable proﬁtd i ﬀers from economic proﬁt to capture the idea
that tax deductible costs in practice deviate from true costs. The deviation may
be given various interpretations. First, it is a fact in many countries that certain
categories of costs are not tax deductible. Notable examples are alcoholic drinks and
bribes. Second, and more importantly, the dividing line between what is deemed an
expense - that can be deducted immediately - and what is deemed an investment,
which is written oﬀ over time, is based on judgement that may not reﬂect the
true economic cost. Third, one may also consider incomplete cost deductions as a
proxy for the distortion imposed on ﬁrms by the inability of governments to set tax
deductible depreciation rates equal to true depreciation rates.15
therefore, provides cartels with an incentive to set up exclusive territories (see Marvel, 1982, and
Tirole, 1988, pp. 183 and 185).
14The eﬀect of diﬀerences in market size on cartel stability is examined in Hauﬂer and Schjelderup
(2004) in a context of commodity taxes.
15The latter problem is well known in public ﬁnance and has various eﬀects on ﬁrm behavior.
See Sinn (1987).
6Taxable proﬁti sg i v e nb y
π
τ
i = pixi − γicxi,i =1 ,2.
where γi is the share of marginal costs that is tax deductible. In principle γi R 1,
so if γi < 1, deductions are incomplete in the sense that deductions fall short of
true costs, whilst if γi > 1 deductions are too generous. Only when γi =1are tax
deductible costs equal to true costs and the corporate tax system is neutral (i.e.,
does not aﬀect ﬁrm behavior).
Denoting ti as the corporate tax rate after tax proﬁti s
Πi = πi − tiπ
τ
i =( a − pi)[pi (1 − ti) − c(1 − γiti)]
=( 1 − ti)(a − pi)
∙





















where ˜ ci (γi,t i) ≡
1−γiti
1−ti c ≡ ²ic is the eﬀective after tax marginal cost and αi ≡
(a − ˜ ci) > 0 for positive sales to occur. ²i is a tax wedge. If the tax code allows full
deductibility of costs (γi =1 )we have that ²i =1 , and ˜ ci = c. The corporate tax
rate is then lump sum in nature, since it does not aﬀect the behavior of the ﬁrm. In
general we assume that this neutrality property does not hold.
From (2) it then follows that the tax code in fact implements two taxes. First,
we have a tax on pure economic proﬁts with tax rate ti. Second, there is a tax on
costs with tax rate τi = ²i − 1.W h e nγi > 1 this implies a subsidy on costs while
t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ei f0 < γi < 1.
For ease of exposition we sometimes refer to a situation where a country is a low
t a xc o u n t r y .B yt h i sw em e a n ;
Deﬁnition 1 Country i is a low tax country if it has a constellation of tax rate and
tax deductibility rule that makes the ﬁrm located in country i al o wc o s tﬁrm that is,
˜ cj > ˜ ci (⇔ ²j >² i,i 6= j).
7For given symmetrical marginal costs c,D e ﬁnition 1 implies a combination of tax
rates and deductibility rules such that either condition (i) or (ii) below is satisﬁed:
(i) ti ≤ tj and 1 > γi ≥ γj,16 or
(ii) ti ≤ tj and γi ≥ γj > 1, whereby the diﬀerence in tax rates is small enough or
the diﬀerence in deductibility rules is large enough in order to sustain ²j >² i.17
In what follows we assume that country 1 is the low tax country and thus that
ﬁrm 1 has the lowest marginal costs (i.e., ˜ c1 < ˜ c2).
3.1 Deviation from cartel agreement
If ﬁrm 1 deviates and exports to country 2 in period 1,i ts e t sap r i c eo ni t se x -
ports (p1
2) equal to its monopoly price in country 1, since this price - given ﬁrm
10s tax advantage over ﬁrm 2 - is below the monopoly price of ﬁrm 2. Hence,
p1
2 = 1

















If ﬁrm 2 deviates and exports to country 1, it cannot use its proﬁt maximizing
(monopoly) price since p2 >p 1. Therefore, the best strategy for ﬁrm 2 is to slightly










α1 [α1 − 2(˜ c2 − ˜ c1)]. (5)
In the punishment phase, both ﬁrms compete over prices. Since ﬁrm 1 is located
in the low tax country it has the lower eﬀective marginal costs (˜ c1 < ˜ c2). Thus,
it will set its price marginally below the eﬀective marginal cost of ﬁrm 2,t h a ti s ,
˜ c2. Since goods are homogeneous, ﬁrm 1 is then the sole provider in both markets,
and earns a proﬁti ne a c hc o u n t r ye q u a lt o(a − p1)[p1 (1 − t1) − c(1 − γ1t1)].T o t a l
16Note that ∂˜ ci
∂γi = − tic
1−ti < 0, thus an increase in tax deductible costs decreases the eﬀective
cost of the ﬁrm for all values of γi.
17These restrictions are necessary because ∂˜ ci
∂ti =
1−γi
(1−ti)2 c<0 if γi > 1.




1 =2 ( 1− t1)α2 (˜ c2 − ˜ c1).




in the punishment period.





1 − 8α2(˜ c2 − ˜ c1)
, (6)
¯ θ2 =




3.2 National diﬀerences in corporate tax systems
In this section we consider equations (6) and (7) in order to determine which ﬁrm is
more likely to defect from the collusive agreement, depending on assumptions made
about national diﬀerences in the corporate tax system.
Proposition 1. It is always the ﬁrm located in the low tax country (ﬁrm 1)t h a t
is more likely to break the collusive agreement.
Proof:F r o mD e ﬁn i t i o n1w eh a v et h a ts i n c eﬁrm 1 i sl o c a t e di nal o wt a x
country, then, (˜ c2 − ˜ c1) > 0 and α1 = a − ˜ c1 >a− ˜ c2 = α2. Thus, the numerators
(N¯ θi)i ne q u a t i o n s( 6 )a n d( 7 )r e l a t et oe a c ho t h e ra sf o l l o w s :N¯ θ1 >N ¯ θ2.F o rt h e
denominators D¯ θ1 and D¯ θ2, we can use α1 = α2+(˜ c2−˜ c1) and binomial rules in the
denominator of (6), to get; D¯ θ1 = α2
1−8α2(˜ c2−˜ c1)=[ α2 − (˜ c2 − ˜ c1)]
2−4α2(˜ c2−˜ c1),
which shows that D¯ θ1 <D ¯ θ2 = α2
2,a s˜ c2 > ˜ c1. Taken together we have that N¯ θ1 >
N¯ θ2 and D¯ θ1 <D ¯ θ2, which unambiguously implies ¯ θ1 > ¯ θ2. ¤
Intuitively, a ﬁrm located in a low tax country can gain more than a ﬁrm located
in a high tax country by defecting from the collusive agreement. The reason is that
its cost advantage implies higher proﬁtb o t hi nt h ed e v i a t i o na n di nt h ep u n i s h m e n t
phase of the game. The low cost ﬁrm, therefore, has a smaller range of discount
factors (i.e., a higher relative discount factor θ) that sustains the cartel solution.
94 Tax Harmonization
We start with the same basic premise as in the previous sections namely that country
1 is a low tax country and ﬁrm 1 is a low cost ﬁrm. We deﬁne a harmonizing company
tax reform as one which narrows or eliminates the diﬀerence between tax rates
and/or deductability rates. We shall refer to unilateral harmonization as the case
where one country changes its tax parameters to a minimum standard. Unilateral
harmonization has been the vehicle for harmonization of commodity taxes within
the European Union. An alternative is to consider a bilateral harmonization process
where both countries change their tax rates and/or deductability rules to a common
tax and/or deductability rule.18
We examine the eﬀects of harmonization by investigating tax base and tax rate
harmonization separately. This is done in order to: (i) compare bilateral and uni-
lateral harmonization to see if one is preferable over the other, and (ii) investigate
whether it is better to harmonize tax bases or tax rates. Underlying the discussion
is an implicit view that monopoly and cartels are undesirable from society’s point of
view. With equal weights on consumer and producer surplus, it is well known that
monopoly produces a deadweight loss that can be reduced by promoting competi-
tion.
4.1 Harmonization of corporate tax rates
Bilateral harmonization. Starting from γ1 > γ2 and t1 <t 2, bilateral harmoniza-
tion of tax rates to a common level implies dt1 > 0 and dt2 < 0, and we assume
that dt1 =
t2−t1
2 and dt2 = −
t2−t1
2 . Firm 1 is the most likely ﬁrm to defect from the
cartel. Let d¯ θ
B
























∂˜ c1 < 0,
∂˜ ci
∂²i > 0, and ∂¯ θ1
∂˜ c2 > 0 (see the Appendix), the precise eﬀect
of the tax rate on the ﬁrm’s eﬀective cost depends on the size of the tax deduction
18Both bilateral and unilateral approaches to harmonization have been studied in the tax liter-
ature. See Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Keen (1987, 1989).







> 0 if γi < 1
< 0 if γi > 1
. (9)





< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1
(10)
When the tax code implies incomplete deductions (γi < 1), bilateral harmonization
stabilizes the cartel. Increasing the tax rate in country 1 raises eﬀective production
costs by ﬁrm 1 and narrows the cost diﬀerential between the two ﬁrms thereby
reducing the gain to ﬁrm 1 from defecting. Furthermore, lowering the tax rate in
country 2 reduces the proﬁto fﬁrm 1 in the punishment phase, since the price
ﬁrm 1 can charge is a decreasing function of ﬁrm 2’s eﬀective costs (˜ c2).I ne i t h e r
case, bilateral harmonization when γi < 1 increases the range of discount rates that
supports the cartel solution for ﬁrm 1.
In contrast, when the tax deductibility parameter implies a subsidy on costs
(γi > 1), bilateral harmonization destabilizes the cartel. An increase in the tax rate
in country 1 enhances the cost advantage of ﬁrm 1 thereby making it more attractive
to deviate. Similarly, a decrease in the tax rate in country 2 lowers the subsidy to
ﬁrm 2 and increases its eﬀective costs (˜ c2) allowing ﬁrm 1 to earn higher proﬁti n
the punishment phase. Consequently, ﬁrm 1 is more likely to break out of the cartel.
Unilateral harmonization. Under unilateral harmonization of corporate tax
rates, only one country changes its tax rate and the approach taken in the European
Union has been to impose a minimum rate that low tax countries must comply with.
In line with this we assume that the low tax country (country 1) must adhere to
a minimum tax rate tmin
1 . Given that t1 <t min
1 <t 2 to begin with, country 1 must
increase its tax rate to tmin
1 whilst country 2 keeps its rate constant. To make our
analysis comparable to the bilateral harmonization above, we assume that minimum
taxation implies an increase in country 1 by dt1 =
t2−t1
2 .D e ﬁne d¯ θ
U
1 as the change













11where the sign of d¯ θ
U





< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1.
(12)
Qualitatively the result is the same as under bilateral harmonization. Comparing
unilateral and bilateral harmonization we know from (10) and (12) that d¯ θ
i
1 < (>)0,
















< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1
(13)
Bilateral harmonization strengthens the collusive agreement more than unilateral
harmonization when γi < 1, whilst bilateral harmonization weakens the cartel more
than unilateral harmonization when γi > 1. Based on (8), (11), and (13) we may
draw the following conclusions;
Proposition 2. Bilateral and unilateral harmonization of corporate tax rates
strengthens (weakens) collusive behavior if tax deductible costs are below (above)
true economic costs. Bilateral harmonization strengthens the cartel solution more
than unilateral harmonization when γi < 1, whilst bilateral harmonization weakens
the cartel solution more than unilateral harmonization when γi > 1.
4.2 Harmonization of tax bases
Bilateral harmonization. We now consider the case of tax base harmonization
from the starting point t1 <t 2 and γ1 > γ2 with ﬁrm 1 as the low-cost ﬁrm. Bilateral
harmonization to a common rate implies dγ1 = −
γ1−γ2
2 < 0 and dγ2 =
γ1−γ2
2 > 0,























Using (see the Appendix) ∂¯ θ1
∂˜ c1 < 0,
∂˜ ci
∂²i > 0 and ∂¯ θ1










1 < 0. (16)
Harmonizing tax bases bilaterally makes collusive agreements more stable. Narrow-
ing the diﬀerential in tax bases shrinks the cost advantage of the low cost ﬁrm and
reduces proﬁt in the deviation and punishment phase.
Unilateral harmonization. Under unilateral harmonization there is a binding
ceiling for depreciations implemented with γ2 < γmax < γ1. If we again assume
that the ceiling, γmax, is the mean of the tax parameters, γ1 and γ2,t h i sr e q u i r e s
a change in the low-tax country tax base according to dγ1 = −
γ1−γ2
2 . This changes













where from the comparative static results presented above it is clear that harmo-
nization of the tax base even to a minimum level stabilizes the cartel, since it reduces
ﬁrm 1’s incentives to deviate. Comparing bilateral and and unilateral harmonization

















It is clear from (18) that bilateral harmonization has a greater impact on the
critical discount factor, thus
Proposition 3. Both bilateral and unilateral harmonization of tax bases strength-
ens incentives for collusion, but the eﬀect is larger under bilateral harmonization.
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 it is seen that cartel stability is diﬀerently af-
fected by tax rate and tax base harmonization. In the latter case harmonization
(unilateral or bilateral) reinforces incentives to stay in the cartel. In contrast, the
stability of a cartel under tax rate harmonization depends on the size of the tax
deductibility rate. Too generous deduction rules (γ > 1) destabilize collusive agree-
ments due to the fact that deduction rules in combination with the tax rate are a
subsidy (if γ > 1)t h a tl o w e r sc o s t so ft h el o wt a xﬁrm and enhances its proﬁti n
the deviation and punishment phase.
If we relax the assumption of marginal costs being identical in both countries
all our results hold and are even enforced if the low cost ﬁrm resides in the low tax
13country, that is, if ²i <² j and ci <c j. Crucial for our results then is that Deﬁnition
1i sf u l ﬁlled. If the opposite constellation is present, that is, ²i <² j but ci >c j,
the high cost ﬁrm is harmed by harmonization, since the cost diﬀerential is widened
when the low tax country increases its eﬀective tax burden. Harmonization then
delivers a double dividend in the sense that it enhances competition and weakens the
incentive for cartel formation. However, strong anecdotical evidence indicates that
the latter case is less realistic. Wages and taxes in the Eastern European countries,
for example, are substantially lower than in Western Europe indicating that low tax
countries host low cost ﬁrms.
4.3 Extension to several countries
Our analysis can be extended to the case of several countries (i.e., n>2). Using
the same set-up as above where diﬀerences in the tax system are the only source of
variety, we focus on two cases. In case (i) country 1 is a low-tax country and there
are (n − 1) identical high tax countries. In case (ii) there are two countries, 1 and
2,h o s t i n gﬁrms with an identical low-cost structure, and (n − 2) countries hosting
high-cost ﬁrms.
In both cases above, a low-cost ﬁrm i earns proﬁt ΠE
i =( n − 1)πE
i if it deviates
from the cartel and exports to the other (n − 1) countries in period 1. As in Section
3.1 it catches its competitors by surprise and sets its monopoly price pi <p j ∀j,
j 6= i in the deviation phase. Proﬁt in the deviation phase is now (n − 1) times
higher than previously and ceteris paribus, this weakens cartel stability. However,
there may be an oﬀsetting eﬀect (depending on assumptions) since there are more
ﬁr m st h a tc a ne x p o r tt ot h eh o m em a r k e to ft h eﬁrm that breaches the collusive
agreement. As a consequence, proﬁt in the punishment phase may fall, and ceteris
paribus, this eﬀect enforces incentives to stay in the cartel. Which of these two eﬀects
dominates depends on the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects and diﬀers in cases
(i) and (ii).
To be speciﬁc, in case (i), there are (n − 1) identical high tax countries and proﬁt
in each of these countries in the punishment period is (as before) zero, whilst the
low-cost ﬁrm earns a positive proﬁt. Proﬁt in the deviation phase by the low cost
ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1) is ΠD
1 =( n−1)πD
1 , and is increasing in the number of countries. Thus,
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= ¯ θ1. (19)
The likelihood of ﬁrm i leaving the cartel increases in the number of high-tax
countries, as the critical discount factor of the low-cost ﬁrm increases disproportion-
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n−1 − 8αj (˜ cj − ˜ ci)
i2 > 0. (21)
Thus, qualitatively the eﬀects of harmonizing either tax rates or tax bases are
unchanged, if we extend the analysis to several high-tax countries.
In case (ii), where there are two identical low-cost ﬁrms, the relevant critical
discount factor changes signiﬁcantly. In the punishment phase, ﬁrm 1,w h i c hi s
assumed to break the collusive agreement, has to cope with the other low-cost ﬁrm
and, hence, the price is driven down to equal the eﬀective marginal cost in all markets











= n − 1 i = {1,2}, (22)
because πE
i = πM
i from (3) and (4). Compared with the original two-country model,
the increased proﬁt in the deviation phase increases the critical discount factor,
whereas the vanishing proﬁts in the punishment phase have a depressing eﬀect. This
trade-oﬀ remains ambiguous and we cannot compare the discount factor in equation







∀i = {1,2},j= {3,...,n}. (23)
Thus, for a low cost ﬁrm, tax harmonization (whether base or rate) does not aﬀect
15the decision to leave the cartel. The intuition is that there is always another identical
ﬁrm and the critical discount factor is only driven by the number of countries, be-
c a u s et h e r ea r ea d d i t i o n a lp r o ﬁts (which are proportionally increasing in the number
of countries) only in the deviation phase. Hence, we conclude
Proposition 4. If the number of countries increases (n>2) and
(i) if there is only one low-tax country, all results from the two-country setting
are preserved qualitatively.
(ii) if there are at least two identical low-tax countries within the Union, neither
coordination in tax rates nor in tax bases has any inﬂuence on cartel stability.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that harmonization of tax rates and tax bases aﬀects the sta-
bility of international cartels and that for the reasonable assumption of incomplete
tax deductible expenses, both bilateral and unilateral harmonization stabilizes col-
lusive agreements. Unilateral harmonization to a minimum standard is preferable to
bilateral harmonization in the sense that it has a smaller eﬀect on the incentive to
stay in the cartel. Our results strengthen previous arguments against harmonization
brought forward in the public choice literature (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan) per-
taining to collusive behavior by governments, and are also in line with more recent
studies, which show that tax harmonization is generally undesirable (e.g., Hauﬂer
and Schjelderup, 2004).
An issue that has not been explicitly analyzed in this paper is how harmonization
aﬀects international cartels when one ﬁrm is located outside the harmonizing area.
The answer to this question, however, follows from our analysis. Harmonization to a
minimum standard, say, on average raises the tax wedge and thus the eﬀective cost
of the low tax ﬁrm in the harmonizing area, thereby reducing its incentive to defect
and export into the outside ﬁrm’s market. For the ﬁrm located outside the Union, the
eﬀect of harmonization depends on its cost (dis-)advantage. If it has lower costs than
any ﬁrm located in the Union, harmonization makes it more attractive to export
to the harmonizing area since eﬀective costs there have gone up. Thus proﬁti nt h e
deviating as well as in the punishment phase of the game has risen. If the outside
16ﬁrm has higher costs, harmonization in the Union strengthens the incentive of the
outside ﬁrm to remain in the cartel. Taken together, harmonization has a dual eﬀect:
on the one hand it stabilizes and segments cartels within the harmonizing union, but
it may, on the other hand, decrease or increase the incentive to defect in a market
with ﬁrms located outside the harmonizing union. In the latter case, however, for
the area that harmonizes, losing market shares to a foreign ﬁrm must be traded oﬀ
against the beneﬁts to consumers from lower prices.
Appendix
As it is always the low-cost ﬁrm which is more likely to leave the cartel, we have to







i − 8αj(˜ cj − ˜ ci)
, (24)
for the changes in tax rates resp. deductibility factors in order to get the eﬀects of
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i (6αi − 8(˜ cj − ˜ ci))
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i [αj − (˜ cj − ˜ ci)]
[α2
i − 8αj (˜ cj − ˜ ci)]
2 =
8α2
i [αi − 2(˜ cj − ˜ ci)]
[α2
i − 8αj (˜ cj − ˜ ci)]
2 > 0, (29)
where the inequality in (27) and (29) holds because αi−2(˜ cj − ˜ ci) > 0 from πE > 0
in equation (5).
















> 0 if γi < 1
< 0 if γi > 1
. (31)
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